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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of employee referrals in the labor market.  Using an original
data set, I find that industries that pay wage premia and have characteristics associated with high-
wage sectors rely mainly on employee referrals to fill jobs.  Moreover, unemployment rates are
higher in industries which use employee referrals more extensively.  This paper develops an
equilibrium matching model which can explain these empirical regularities.  In this model, the
matching process sorts heterogeneous firms and workers into two distinct groups:  referrals match
“good” jobs to “good” workers, while formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads and employment
agencies) match less-attractive jobs to disadvantaged workers. Thus, well-connected workers who
learn quickly about job opportunities use referrals to jump job queues, while those who are less well
placed in the labor market search for jobs through formal methods.  The split of firms and workers
between referrals and formal search is, however, not necessarily efficient.  Congestion externalities
in referral search imply that unemployment would be closer to the optimal rate if firms and workers
‘at the margin’ searched formally.3
I. Introduction
In their 1962 study of the Chicago Labor Market, Albert Rees and George
Shultz (1970) found that high wage employers relied extensively on employee
referrals to fill their vacancies.  They found that high wage employers who were
satisfied with their work force preferred to use this hiring channel, because, in the
their view, employee referrals provided them with initial screening and subsequent
monitoring of new employees.  Low wage employers, however, were either
continuously trying to upgrade their work force or faced difficulties with employee
cliques and, therefore, these employers preferred using formal hiring channels, such as
newspaper advertisements and employment agencies.
Three decades after Rees’ and Shultz’ study, the link between the payment of
wage premiums and referral hiring continues to be a pervasive phenomenon not only
in Chicago, but all over the United States.  An industry that hires 25 percent more of
their work force through referrals than the average industry also pays wages that are
15.2 percent higher than the wages paid by the average industry in the economy.
1
Likewise, firm level data show that firms operating in industries that pay wage
premiums are more likely to have hired their current employees through referrals.
2  In
addition, the data reveal that industries with characteristics associated with the
                                                       
1The data for this estimation are obtained by merging data from different sources.  Data on the use of
employee referrals by industry are obtained from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth which
asks a sample of 12,123 employees in all industries whether they were referred by a current
employee.  The industry premiums data are the Krueger and Summers’ (1988) estimates obtained
using the Current Population Survey.  In addition, we merge data on industry characteristics from the
National Organizations Survey which includes information on:  profits, assets, sales, concentration
ratios, capital intensity, percent of unionized workers, percent of male workers, and average
establishment size in each industry.  Finally, we also merge information on the average experience
and average education in each industry, which are estimated from the Current Population Survey.
The data are described in more detail in Section 2.4
payment of wage premiums (e.g., high profits and small labor shares of income) rely
more extensively on employee referrals.  Firm level data also show that firms
operating in industries with these characteristics are more likely to have hired their
employees through referrals.  This evidence on the link between the inter-industry
wage structure and the use of referrals indicates that jobs filled through referrals are
likely to pay wages above market clearing.  Moreover, consistent with this
interpretation, industry data reveals that unemployment rates are higher in industries
that hire a larger percentage of workers through referrals.  These empirical
regularities have important policy implications, because they suggest that searching
through friends and relatives for these rationed jobs leaves “too many persons
unemployed waiting for good jobs, while less desirable [jobs] go begging.” (Tobin,
1972)
Ethnographic studies of the labor market experience of working class youths
further document the link between the payment of wage premiums and employee
referrals.  A study by Wial (1991) describes the workers’ analogue of Rees’ and
Shultz’ explanation for the effectiveness of employee referrals in filling high wage
jobs.  Wial’s study of three ethnic neighborhoods of Boston found that workers
believed that obtaining a “good” job
3 required either “luck or the help of a friend or
relative who [would] put in a good word with the boss.” (Wial, 1991)  The perception
of Boston youths that a good word put in by friends and relatives was crucial to
                                                                                                                                                            
2Firm level data merged with corresponding industry and employee information are obtained from
the National Organizations Survey.  See Section 2 for more details about this data set.
3The workers in the Boston study considered “good” jobs to be jobs that offered high pay and
considerable job security.  Among the examples of “good” jobs provided by these employees were
jobs in Public Utilities, Transportation, Repair Services, and Construction, all industries which have
been documented to pay wage premiums (see, Krueger and Summers, 1987, 1988).  Finally, the5
obtain a “good” job coincides with the view of high wage employers in Chicago who
indicated that employee referrals provided them with good information about the
quality and future behavior of new employees.  According to residents in the ethnic
neighborhoods studied by Wial, however, low wage jobs could be easily obtained
without the need of personal contacts.  As a resident of South Boston, an Irish
neighborhood, remarked, “There’s always something.  Anyone can do shipping and
receiving or be a porter in a nursing home, and they’re always hiring.” (Wial, 1991)
This paper will explain why there might be such a link between the payment of
wage premiums and reliance on employee referrals.  Employee referrals can act as a
bond for new employees: referred workers are compelled to work diligently out of
obligation to those who found them their jobs.  When a referee posts a bond (“puts in
a good word”) for the new employee, the threat of having to forfeit a friend’s current
and future support creates work incentives for the new employee.  Thus, employee
referrals like bonds posted by workers, fines levied on workers caught shirking, and
an upward tilt in the age earnings profile provide a penalty for shirking which can
substitute for the payment of wages above market clearing.  However, in contrast to
wage schemes which are subject to moral hazard from firms,
4 employee referrals are
easier to enforce because they do not require honesty from the part of firms but they,
instead, require honesty from the part of friends and relatives.  Consequently, firms
with honest workers benefit from hiring through employee referrals which replicate an
honest work force and save them on the wages they have to pay to motivate new
                                                                                                                                                            
workers in the study saw “good” jobs as being scarce, in the sense that there was always an excess
supply of entry-level job applicants for these jobs.6
workers.  However, referrals have no value for firms with dishonest employees
because the “good word” from the referee cannot act as a bond for new employees.
Firms with dishonest employees avoid using referrals which would only replicate a
dishonest work force and, instead, they rely on formal hiring channels.
This paper develops a matching model which illustrates how the use of
employee referrals and formal search channels generates labor market segmentation.
Employee referrals allow firms with honest workers to lower the efficiency wages
they have to pay to elicit honesty from new workers.  Firms that have paid efficiency
wages in the past are ensured of having honest workers and, thus, find it beneficial to
use referrals.  Firms that have not paid efficiency wages before, however, most likely
have a dishonest work force and, thus, accrue no benefit from using employee
referrals.  Thus, firms choose simultaneously between paying efficiency wages and
hiring through referrals, and paying the market clearing wage and hiring through
formal channels.  The firm’s choice of the combination of wages and hiring channel
depends on how costly it is to fill vacancies through employee referrals compared to
formal channels.  Filling jobs through referrals is more costly because referrals
generate a smaller quantity of applicants than formal hiring channels and, thus, the use
of employee referrals prolongs the time it takes to fill the vacancy.  While firms hiring
formally tend to receive a large number of interested applicants, firms hiring through
employee referrals have to wait for current employees to approach their friends and
relatives and then wait for them to express an interest in the job to arrange for an
interview.  Consequently, in the model, firms with heterogeneous arrival rates of
                                                                                                                                                            
4It has been noted that firms using these wage schemes “have an obvious incentive to declare workers
shirking and appropriate bonds, collect fines, or replace them with fee-paying workers.” (Akerlof and7
applicants split between referrals and formal hiring channels.  The opportunity cost of
holding a vacancy is low for firms with high arrival rates of applicants and, thus, they
use referrals.  The opportunity cost of holding a vacancy is, however, much higher for
firms with low arrival rates and thus they hire formally.
Workers on their part would always prefer to obtain a high wage job.
However, workers are aware that obtaining a “good” job requires the help of a friend
or relative who is willing to put in a good word.  Whether a worker decides to pursue
a good job by using referrals or to search formally for a bad job depends on how long
the worker would have to remain unemployed until he can locate a desirable job
through his circle of friends and extended family.  Workers searching through referrals
have to wait until a job opens up at the establishment where a family member or friend
works and then wait for this person to arrange an interview with the employer.  Thus,
in the model, workers with heterogeneous arrival rates of job offers split between
referral search and formal search.  Well-connected workers can expect to experience
short unemployment spells when using referrals and, thus, prefer to search through
this channel.  Workers without many contacts, however, would experience painfully
long unemployment spells if they searched through referrals and, thus, they rely on
formal search.
The model shows that the matching process generates labor market
segmentation.  Search channels sort heterogeneous firms and workers into two
distinct groups: referrals match “good” jobs to “good” workers, while formal channels
match less attractive jobs to disadvantaged workers.  Firms that attract a large number
of applicants every time a vacancy opens hire through referrals and pay efficiency
                                                                                                                                                            
Yellen, 1986)8
wages.  Similarly, well-connected workers who can find jobs easily through personal
contacts search through referrals, and earn high wages.  By comparison, firms that
receive few applicants per vacancy, use formal hiring channels and pay market
clearing wages.  Also, workers that receive few job offers through referrals, either
because they face disadvantages in the labor market or because they are less
productive, end up finding their jobs through formal channels and earning low wages.
Two major economic theories have been previously put forth to explain why
referred workers earn higher wages than formal hires.  Match-quality theories of
referrals posit that personal contacts provide better match-quality information to
potential applicants allowing them to self-select into those jobs in which they are more
productive.  Ability-based theories of referrals explain why firms may prefer to use
employee referrals when the competitive labor market is characterized by adverse
selection.  While both of these theories can explain why particular individuals hired
through referrals receive  higher wages, neither of these theories can explain why
firms that pay wage premiums to all workers rely more on employee referrals.  Also,
these two theories cannot explain why firms operating in industries with
characteristics associated with high wage industries rely more on referrals, nor can
they explain why unemployment rates are higher in industries that use referrals more
extensively.
This paper offers a theoretical explanation of why employee referrals may be
associated with the payment of wage premiums and with higher unemployment.  As
explained above, this explanation suggests that jobs filled through referrals are not
only more desirable but they are also scarcer.  Consequently, there are too many9
people searching for jobs through personal contacts relative to the number of available
jobs filled in this way.  Referral matching, thus, generates problems of congestion in
the labor market.  To be precise, workers searching through referrals impose
congestion externalities on each other: a worker deciding to join a queue for “good”
jobs considers his probability of obtaining a job, but he does not consider the effect of
his decision on others.  This congestion externality implies that the number of workers
searching through referrals is likely to be inefficiently high.  Moreover, the
unemployment rate is also likely to be inefficiently high because congestion prolongs
unemployment spells for those searching through referrals,
Policies that increase search costs for the unemployed (such as unemployment
taxes and job-start subsidies) can increase the incentives to use formal search channels
and lower unemployment closer to its optimal rate.  A rise in search costs increases
the incentives to use formal channels, because the losses from long unemployment
spells experienced when searching through referrals are larger.  Consequently, by
increasing formal search and reducing referral search, an increase in search costs
mitigates congestion and reduces unemployment.  Unemployment is reduced both
because the number of unemployed workers who queue for “good” jobs is smaller and
because the unemployment spells of those queuing for “good” jobs are shorter.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section II presents evidence from
two different data sets on the link between referrals and the inter-industry wage
structure.  Section III models the matching process and derives the endogenous split
between matches occurring through referrals and formal matches.  Section IV shows
the effects of the congestion externality on unemployment duration.  Moreover, we10
discuss market and non-market mechanisms to correct the externality, and present the
welfare consequences of imposing a combination of taxes-cum-subsidies.  Section V
discusses the model in the context of the empirical regularities established in Section
II and contrasts it against alternative theories of referrals.  Section VI concludes.
II.  Evidence on the Link Between Referrals and the Inter-Industry Wage
Structure
This section establishes a link between referrals and the inter-industry wage
structure.  In particular, we determine the relations between referrals and the payment
of wage premiums, industry characteristics, unemployment, tenure, and the
occupational structure.  We use an industry level data set, constructed by the author,
which allows one to examine the relation between referral hiring, wage premiums, and
industry characteristics at the one-digit, two-digit and three-digit levels of
aggregation.  We also present additional evidence from the National Organizations
Survey on the relation between hiring channels and industry characteristics.  The
empirical regularities established by the data provide the appropriate background to
develop and interpret the model in Section III.
II.1. The Industry Data
To investigate the relation between referral matching and the payment of
efficiency wages, I merge data on employee referrals, industry wage premiums, and
industry characteristics from various sources.  I obtain data on the percentage of
referred workers by industry from the 1982 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth.  The advantage of using data from the NLSY is that we can obtain precise
information on whether workers hired in a particular industry were referred by current11
employees.  Using the 1982 NLSY, I estimate the percentage of workers referred by
current employees for one-digit, two-digit, and three-digit industries using 1980
Census classification codes.
5  The data for industry wage premiums is obtained from
Krueger and Summers (1988).  I use Krueger and Summers’ wage differentials for
one-digit, two-digit, and three-digit industries estimated with the 1984 Current
Population Survey.  I also use data for the 1980's from the Current Population Survey
to estimate the average years of education and the average years of potential
experience in each industry.  Finally, I obtain data on industry characteristics for one-
digit and two-digit industries from the National Organizations Survey, which is
described below.  Merging information from these various sources, I obtain data sets
for one-digit, two-digit, and three-digit industries.
Tables 1 and 2 present correlation matrices which offer a first look at the data.
Table 1 presents the correlation matrix of the percentage of referred workers in each
industry, industry wage premiums, and a number of industry characteristics.  The first
column in the correlation matrix shows that the percentage of referred workers is
positively correlated with industry premiums, profits, concentration ratios, capital’s
share of income, assets, sales, average establishment sizes, the percentage of
unionized workers, and the percentage of men in the industry.
6  Table 2 presents the
same correlation matrix as Table 1, but it includes a measure of wage premiums which
contains fringe benefits as well as wage compensation.  The first column corroborates
                                                       
5A shortcoming of  this data set is that it only includes people between the ages of 14 and 27.
However, various studies have documented that older workers use personal contacts more extensively
than younger workers (Granovetter, 1995; Corcoran et al., 1980).  Thus, it is likely that, if there is a
bias, the results will underestimate rather than overestimate the relation between employee referrals
and different industry characteristics.
6Note that all other results in the matrix coincide with previous findings of the correlations between
industry premiums and industry characteristics (see Dickens and Katz, 1987a).12
that the percentage of referred workers in the industry is strongly correlated with the
total compensation measure of industry wage premiums.
Tables 3 and 4 present similar correlation matrices to those in Tables 1 and 2,
but  using data for two-digit industries.  Like the correlation matrices for the one-digit
industry data, the correlation matrix in Table 3 shows that the percentage of workers
hired by employee referrals is positively correlated with industry wage premiums.
Moreover, the percentage of referred workers is positively correlated with various
industry characteristics associated with high wage industries.  Table 4 shows that the
correlation between the percentage of referred workers and total compensation wage
premiums is even stronger than the correlation between the share of referred workers
and the measure of wage premiums which excludes nonwage compensation.
II.2. Empirical Regularities
A first look at the data shows that industries and firms that rely more on
referrals also pay higher wages and have characteristics associated with high-wage
sectors.  In this section, we provide further evidence of the relation between referrals
and the inter-industry wage structure.
II.2.1. The Link between Referrals and Industry Wage Premiums
The use of referrals is positively associated with the payment of wage
premiums.  Tables 1-4 show that the percentage of referred workers in an industry is
strongly correlated with the payment of a wage premium in the industry.  Moreover,
regression analysis of inter-industry wage differentials on industrial hiring and other
industry characteristics provides further evidence of this link.  Tables 5, 6, and 7 show
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the regressions of the estimated wage differentials for two-digit and three-digit
industries on the percentage of referred workers in two-digit and three-digit
industries, respectively.
7  The results of the regressions for two-digit industries
corroborate that high wage industries rely more on employee referrals.  Column (1) in
Table 5 shows that industries where the share of referred workers is 25 percent higher
than in the average industry pay a wage premium that is 15.17 percent higher than the
average wage in all industries.  This implies that, for example, an industry like primary
metals which pays a 15 percent wage premium also hires 25 percent more of its
workforce by referrals than the average industry in the economy.  Using instead the
total compensation measure of wage premiums shows that industries where the
proportion of referred workers is 25 percent higher than in the average industry are
associated with industries that pay a total compensation that is 22.99 percent higher
than in the average industry (see Column (1) in Table 6).  Thus, firms operating in
industries that rely more on employee referrals not only pay higher wages, but they
also provide more fringe benefits.  Table 7 presents similar results using three-digit
industry data.
8
                                                       
7This analysis differs from previous empirical studies which examine the ‘returns’ of referrals for
individual employees by including a referral dummy into a standard wage regression (Corcoran et
al., 1980; Staiger, 1990; Simon and Warner, 1992).
8Tables 5, 6, and 7 also present regressions which include controls for the average level of education
and experience in the industry, as well as other industry characteristics (for regressions using two-
digit industry data).  We include these controls to verify that the relation between higher wages in the
industry and reliance on referrals does not simply reflect the higher ability of referred workers.  The
regressions show an even stronger link between referrals and the payment of wage premiums when
we control for average worker ability in the industry.  Column (2) in Table 5 shows that, after
controlling for differences in education and experience across industries, a 25 percent increase in
referral hiring is associated with the payment of a 17.14 percent wage premium over the average
wage in all industries.  Column (2) in Table 6 shows that, after controlling for measured ability, a 25
percent higher proportion of workers hired through referrals is associated with total compensation
that is 24.97 percent above the total compensation in all industries.14
II.2.2. Characteristics of Industries Hiring through Referrals
The pervasiveness of referral hiring is also related to industry characteristics
associated with the payment of high wages.  Industries with higher profits, larger
capital income shares (lower labor shares of income), higher concentration ratios,
larger average establishment sizes,  higher percentages of unionized workers, and
higher percentages of men, rely more extensively on employee referrals.  At the same
time, previous studies of the inter-industry wage structure have shown that all of these
industry characteristics are associated with the payment of wage premiums. (Dickens
and Katz, 1986a, 1986b; Krueger and Summers, 1987, 1988)  Thus, the links between
industry characteristics and employee referrals provide further evidence of the relation
between referral hiring and the inter-industry wage structure.
Tables 1-4 show positive correlations between the characteristics of high-
wage industries and the use of employee referrals.  Moreover, when we include
industry profits, capital income shares, concentration ratios, and the percentage of
unionized workers as controls in the wage differential regressions, the relation
between the percentage of referred workers and the wage premiums weakens, thus,
indicating that the referral variable was partially capturing the relation of these other
industry characteristics with the wage premiums. (See columns (3)-(5) in Tables 5 and
6)
II.2.3. Referrals and Industry Unemployment Rates
The finding that industries with higher shares of referred workers pay higher
wages suggests that firms operating in these industries pay wages above market
clearing and, thus, ration their jobs.  If this were the case, then we would expect to15
find higher unemployment rates in industries that rely extensively on referrals.  Table 8
presents the regression results of industry unemployment rates on the percentage of
referred workers in each industry.  Industries where the share of referred workers is
higher have higher unemployment rates (see columns (1) and (2) in Table 8).  I also
find that the inverse relation between referral hiring and unemployment is greater in
industries where jobs are more likely to be rationed.  Column (3) in Table 8 shows a
stronger association between unemployment and referral hiring in industries with
higher profits, and presumably in which higher rents are paid.
II.2.4. Job Tenure of Referred Workers
Previous work on the inter-industry wage structure has demonstrated that
turnover has a negative correlation with industry wage differentials. In particular, the
evidence shows a positive relation between job tenure and industry wage differentials.
(Krueger and Summers, 1988)  If workers in industries hiring through referrals earned
rents, then we would expect them to have longer job tenure than workers in industries
hiring formally.  In fact, the longer tenure of workers hired through referrals is well
documented.  Datcher (1983) uses the 1978 wave of the PSID, Staiger (1990) uses
data from the 1982 NLSY, and Simon and Warner (1992) use the 1972 Survey of
Natural and Social Scientists and Engineers to document the longer tenure of referred
workers.
II.2.5. Types of Workers Hired through Referrals
Evidence on the inter-industry wage structure shows that industry premiums
are paid uniformly across occupations.  That is, industries that pay high wages to blue16
collar employees also pay high wages to white collar employees, while industries that
pay low wages to blue collar employees also pay low wages to white collar
employees.  We find, however, that industries do not use referral hiring uniformly
across occupations.  Instead,  high-wage industries use referrals to hire workers in
blue-collar and service occupations, but they tend to rely on formal methods to hire
white-collar employees (evidence from the NOS is presented in Table 9).
9  An
explanation of referrals, thus, must be able to account for differences in hiring
channels across occupations.
II.3. Additional Evidence from the National Organizations Survey
We also analyze data from the National Organizations Survey (NOS)
10 to
examine the relation between referral hiring and industry characteristics.  We obtain
significant  coefficients with the expected signs on the relations between various
industry characteristics and the likelihood of having been hired through a referral.  We
find that firms operating in industries that pay higher average wages are more likely to
                                                       
9The greater reliance on referrals to hire blue-collar and service workers and the lesser use of
referrals to hire white collar employees has also been documented with other data sets.  Corcoran et
al. (1980) present evidence from the PSID, Staiger (1990) presents evidence from the 1982 NLSY,
and Holzer (1996) presents evidence from his Multi-City Employer Survey.
10This data set contains information which allows one to determine the relation between firms’
hiring channels and the characteristics of firms and industries in which these firms operate.  The
NOS matches relevant information on employed respondents with information on their employers
and industries. The NOS surveyed a representative sample of work establishments in the United
States in 1991. The probability sample of all types, sizes, and ages of establishments used to generate
the data set was obtained from information provided by respondents to the 1991 General Social
Survey (the GSS is an annual survey of the U.S. population conducted by the NORC).  The 1991
GSS survey was used to construct the sample for the NOS because in this year a topical module
dealing with work organizations was conducted which collected information on various aspects of
work experience, including information on job-search methods, as well as the names, addresses, and
phone number of the respondents’ employers. The questionnaire to establishments focused on their
characteristics, and on their human resource practices and policies.  More importantly, this national
database on work establishments has been supplemented with aggregate data from various
government sources on the characteristics of the industries in which the establishments operate.  The
final sample consists of the 727 cases that provide complete data on establishments.17
have hired their workers through referrals.  The probit estimation in column (2) of
Table 9 indicates that a firm operating in an industry that pays average wages of
$26,500, instead of operating in an industry that pays wages of $19,800 on average, is
30 percent more likely to hire its employees through referrals.  The NOS data also
confirms that other industry attributes characterizing high-wage industries (i.e.,
industry profits and labor’s shares of income) are associated with more extensive
hiring through referrals (see columns (3) and(4) in Table 9).
III.  The Matching Model with Referrals and Formal Search
In this section, I present a model in which heterogeneous workers and firms
engage in a costly process of search in the labor market.  They meet each other in the
market either through referrals or through formal channels.  Because some workers
are better connected than others, and some firms are more attractive than others, the
cost of search differs across workers and across firms using referrals.  In the formal
sector, all workers have access to the same information about jobs, and likewise all
firms have access to the same information about applicants.  Thus, all workers
searching formally face the same search costs and, similarly, all firms searching
formally face the same search costs.  Moreover, formal channels are a quicker way of
finding out about jobs and applicants and, thus, it is cheaper for both workers and
firms to search formally.  While formal search consists of one-on-one meetings with
anyone who is available in the market, referral search is time-consuming because it
requires one-on-one meetings with acquaintances in one’s network.
Workers and firms split in their search by focusing on referrals or by focusing
on formal channels.  Depending on their search costs, some workers benefit from18
focusing their search through referrals, while others find it beneficial to focus their
search formally.  Likewise, firms are divided into those that fill their jobs through
referrals and those that fill formally.
When a firm with a vacancy meets an unemployed worker, they must choose a
wage and the effort of the worker.  In the tradition of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), a
firm that wants to increase output by increasing effort, at the same level of
monitoring, (or, equivalently, a firm that wants to save on monitoring costs) pays
higher wages.  In this paper, when a referral matches up a worker and a firm, the
monitoring role played by the referee allows the firm to save on higher wages without
reducing employee effort.  Thus, firms hiring through referrals can motivate workers
and increase output by paying wages that are moderately above the market wage.
Firms hiring formally, however, pay the market wage because they do not find it
worthwhile to pay the very high wages that would get their employees not to shirk.
III.1. Description of the Model
The entire system describing the model is presented in the table below.  The
following diagram provides a graphical representation of how the model works.  This
diagram describes the different states of workers and firms, as well as the choices that
they make in the labor market (the model’s equations corresponding to the workers’
and firms’ decisions are included in parenthesis).  The diagram also describes how the
matching process occurs and how the total number of jobs and unemployed workers
is determined in the economy.
Workers (L)19







Decision of how to search depends on
individual’s i type (Equation (8)
determines the arrival rate for individual i
who is marginal between the two search
channels).
Decision on whether to exert effort or not
depends on the wage paid, which, in turn,
depends on the search channel used by the
firm and worker.
Firms (K)











Decision of how to search depends on
firm’s f type (Equation (7) determines the
arrival rate for firm f that is marginal
between the two search channels).
Decision on what wage to pay depends on
the search channel used by the firm to fill
the job.
The model generates a correspondence between workers and firms using
referrals, and between firms and workers using formal channels.  In the steady-state
equilibrium, the flow out of unemployment equals the flow into unemployment for
workers using each search channel.  Likewise, the flow of vacancies equals the flow
of jobs being filled through each channel.  These steady-state conditions determine the
effectiveness of each search channel for workers and firms of all types.
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(1)  x(1-uRi) =   b i pu
R uRi
(2)  x(1-uF) =   b pu
F uF
(3)  x(1-oRf) = (af + z) po
R oRf
(4)  x(1-oF) = (a + z) po
F oF
(5)  VE
Mi =  VS
Mi,  for  M = R, F.
(6)  r = E(profits|referrals) + E(profits|formal)
(7)  Vo
Ri ( ￿ wRi (bi) ˛ R wRi g(wRi) dwRi )=  Vo
Fi ( ￿ wFi (bi )  ˛ F wFi g(wFi) dwFi)
(8)  Vu
Ri (wRi ) =  Vu
Fi (wFi )
(9)  [￿bi ˛ R  b i pu
R uRi LR f(b i ) dbi ] = x [￿af ˛ R  (1 - oRf ) KR h(af ) daf ]
(10)  [￿bi ˛ F b pu
F uF LF f(b i ) dbi ] = x [￿af ˛ F (1 - oF ) KF h(af ) daf ]
(11)  [￿af ˛ R (af + z) po
R oRf KR h(af ) daf ] = [￿bi ˛ R bi pu
R uRi LR f(b i ) dbi ]
(12)  [￿af ˛ F (a + z) po
F oF KF h(af ) daf =[￿bi ˛ F b pu
F uF LF f(b i ) dbi ]
(13)  K= JR + OR + JF + OF
(14)  L = [￿b
 b
 f(b i ) dbi ] = ER + UR + EF + UF
III.2. Workers’ and Firms’ Decisions in the Labor Market21
The above system describes the supply side and the demand side of the labor
market.  Below, we describe in more detail how the decisions of workers (the supply
side) and the decisions of firms (the demand side) are made.
III.2.1. Workers
Workers can be either employed or unemployed.  When workers are
unemployed, they focus their search through referrals or through formal channels.
Each worker faces a search cost s per unit time, and thus his total search cost depends
on how quickly he is able to find a job.  Workers searching through referrals find jobs
at the rate bi pu
R which depends on the arrival rate of encounters of worker of type i
with those in his social network, bi ˛ [b,b].  Moreover, the arrival rate of jobs
depends on the effectiveness of referral search, which is given by the proportionality
factor, pu
R.  Workers searching formally find jobs at the rate bpu
F which is the same
for all workers.  The rate at which workers find formal jobs depends on the
effectiveness of formal search, which is given by a proportionality factor, pu
F.
Once employed, workers choose whether to exert effort, e=ê , or to exert no
effort, e=0.  The workers disutility of work is c(ê)=ê².  Since shirkers face an
exogenous probability q of being caught, a worker exerts effort only if he is paid a
high enough wage.  If the wage is very low, however, workers will not exert effort.
In addition, however, referred workers can be perfectly monitored by their peer
referees.  Although peers do not report their friends to supervisors, they prefer for
their co-workers to exert as much effort as they do.
11  When referred workers do not
conform to their work ethic, referees impose peer-pressure on their co-worker22
friends.  Thus, a worker who is referred by a diligent referee loses face with him if he
shirks, while a worker who is referred by a shirker is ostracized if he works.




where eW is the effort level of the referee and eR is the effort level of the referred
worker.  When a high effort worker refers a friend, he imposes peer-pressure on his
friend only if he fails to exert effort.  Having been referred by a hard working referee,
thus, acts as a performance bond for a new employee.  The implicit bond is the
referee’s support which the new worker has to renounce when he shirks.
III.2.2. Firms
Firms have jobs that are either filled or vacant.  It is assumed that each firm
has only one job.  All jobs are subject to an exogenous breakup rate x.  When a job is
vacant, the firm decides whether to focus its search through referrals or through
formal channels.  The cost to a firm from holding a vacancy is the foregone stream of
profits during the time the vacancy remains unfilled.  A firm f hiring through referrals
fills its job at the rate (af+z)po
R, which depends on firm-specific factors, af ˛ [a,a] (i.e.,
the idiosyncratic arrival rate of applicants) and on labor market factors that affect all
firms, z (e.g., the relative abundance of the type of labor being hired).  Moreover, the
rate at which vacant jobs are filled depends on the effectiveness of referral search for
firms, which is given by the proportionality factor, po
R.  Firms searching formally fill
                                                                                                                                                            
11See Jones (1984) for evidence and discussion of conformist behavior at the workplace.23
jobs at the rate (a+z)po
F, which is the same for all firms.  The rate at which firms fill
jobs formally depends on the effectiveness of formal search, which is given by the
proportionality factor, po
F.
Once the job has been filled through a given channel, the firm must then
choose a wage that minimizes its labor costs per efficiency unit.  A firm that pays a
high wage can increase output by eliciting worker effort.  A worker produces A units
of output per unit time when he exerts effort, but only gA units of output when he
shirks.
III.3. Solution to the Model
A firm that meets a worker through a given channel must choose a wage and,
accordingly, the worker must choose whether or not to exert effort.  Given the wage
offer appropriate to each channel, a firm with a vacancy must decide either to use
referrals or to search formally.  Likewise, given the expected wage offers through
each channel, workers must decide whether to focus their search through referrals or
to search formally.  In the steady-state equilibrium, there is a correspondence between
workers and firms using each search channel.
III.3.1. The Choice of Wages
A firm that has filled a vacancy using a given channel has to decide on the
wage offer it will extend its new worker.  In particular, to maximize its gains, a firm
must decide whether to offer a high wage that motivates the worker to produce a high
level of output or to offer a wage that just satisfies the employee to come to work.24
Define VJ
Mi as the lifetime stream of profits for a firm with a job filled with an
individual of type i through method M (where M=R,F).  Similarly, define VO
Mi as the
lifetime stream of profits of a firm filling its vacancies by method M with an expected
group of applicants of type i.  The optimal value equation for a firm with a job filled
with individual i is
rVJ




where R(A) is the firm’s revenue which is equal to A if workers exert effort and gA if
workers shirk.  When the vacancy has been filled by method M, the firm’s goal is to
pay a wage that maximizes its lifetime stream of profits, VJ
Mi.  Thus, depending on
how the firm’s vacancy has been filled, the firm will either pay the lowest possible
efficiency wage (which results in high output levels) or it will pay the market wage
(which satisfies the employee to come to work).
The optimal value equation for firm f with a vacancy is
 rVO
Mi = - r + ￿ wMi (bi) ˛ M  p(af ,M)(VJ
Mi - VO
Mi ) g(wMi) dwMi ,
(ii)
where p(af ,M) is the rate at which firm f fills its vacant job when using search method
M.  This rate is equal to (af+z)po
R if the job is filled through referrals and equal to
(a+z)po
F if the job is filled formally.  Vacancies can be created or eliminated freely, but
there is a fixed cost of capital r of maintaining a job (either filled or vacant).  Only
after the firm has incurred the fixed cost, nature assigns it an idiosyncratic arrival rate
of applicants, af .
 For a firm to elicit effort and obtain higher output, it must pay a high enough
wage such that worker i is indifferent between working and shirking.  Thus, the firm25
must pay a wage that satisfies the no-shirking condition (NSC) given by equation (5)




Mi are the expected lifetime utilities for
an employed non-shirker and for an employed shirker of type i, respectively, who
obtained his job through method M.  The asset equations for the worker i’s lifetime
utilities are
rVE














where p(bi ,M) is the rate at which an unemployed worker of type i using method M
finds work.  The arrival rate of job opportunities of individual i searching through
referrals is bipu
R, and the arrival rate of job opportunities for workers searching
formally is bpu
F.  Substituting equations (iii), (iv), and (v) into the no-shirking
condition yields the efficiency  wage wMi
* that a firm which has filled its job through
method M should pay to elicit effort from worker i.  After determining the efficiency
wage for each search channel in this way, we can contrast the wages firms hiring
through referrals and firms hiring formally have to pay to motivate workers.  The next
lemma compares the efficiency wage a firm hiring through employee referrals must
pay to the efficiency wage a firm hiring formally must pay.
LEMMA 1.1:  The efficiency wage a firm has to pay is lower if worker i is hired by
an employee referral than if he is hired formally:
wRi
* =  ê² - s + (r+x+bi pu
R ) ê²(1 - q)/q < wF
* =  ê² - s + (r+x+bpu
F ) ê²/q.26
(vi)
PROOF:  All proofs are in the Appendix.
When firms use employee referrals, they are able to pay lower efficiency
wages, without adversely affecting worker productivity, for two reasons.  First,
implicit bonding enforced by social networks allows firms to pay lower efficiency
wages to motivate workers.  This is because trustworthy referees initially put in a
good word for their friends, but they credibly threaten to withdraw their support and
impose sanctions whenever their referred friends shirk.  Second, because it is harder
for workers who search through referrals to find alternative job opportunities, firms
hiring through referrals find it easier to motivate workers.
Lemma 1.1 shows that there is a low enough wage that get referred workers
not to shirk, but the wage that gets formal hires not to shirk is much higher.  If both
firms hiring formally and firms hiring through referrals were willing to pay efficiency
wages, then the labor market would consist exclusively of non-shirkers.  In the non-
trivial case in which some workers shirk and, thus, some firms do not pay efficiency
wages, firms hiring through referrals pay efficiency wages because they can save on
monitoring costs and firms hiring formally, instead, pay a market wage to shirkers.
The above Lemma indicates that the implicit bonding imposed by referees,
allows firms hiring through employee referrals to lower efficiency wages and, thus, to
reduce unemployment.  The question then arises whether ingenious recruitment
methods such as referrals can be so effective as to eliminate involuntary
unemployment.  Lemma 1.2 shows that under a strong condition on peer monitoring,
the equilibrium efficiency wage does not require the payment of rents.27
LEMMA 1.2:  As the cost from peer-pressure imposed by referees gets to be as large
as the workers’ disutility for work, the wage paid by firms hiring through referrals
approaches a lower bound:
 lim      wRi
* =  ê² - s.
 qﬁ1  (vii)
This lemma determines that for referrals to eliminate the payment of efficiency
wages, peer-pressure would have to be sufficiently strong to motivate workers
without the payment of rents.  However, corollary 2.1 below shows that when q
approaches 1, then every worker prefers to search formally and, thus, every match in
the economy occurs through formal channels.  Moreover, if the wage in condition
(vii) is greater than the formal wage, firms can pay lower efficiency wages by using
referrals but they cannot completely eliminate the payment of rents to motivate
workers.
Rather than paying efficiency wages, employers hiring formally pay a wage
high enough to attract shirkers to come to work, and low enough so that the employer
does not expect to make losses.  The formal wage, wF, is thus determined by the zero-
profit condition given by equation (6) in the model.  The firm’s expected profits must
equal its fixed cost of capital, r:
r = E(profits|referral) + E(profits|formal).
(6)
Prior to incurring the fixed cost that allows the firm to create a vacancy, the firm does
not know its type and, thus, it does not know its optimal search channel.  Once, the
firm has incurred the cost, nature assigns the firm an arrival rate of applicants, af.  If
the arrival rate of applicants is high enough to allow the firm to fill the vacancy28
quickly, then the firm uses referrals.  However, if the arrival rate is low, the firm relies
instead on formal channels.  Moreover, the expected efficiency wage the firm has to
pay depends on the group of applicants with type i searching through referrals.  Thus,
the zero-profit condition for the average firm determines the formal wage:
r=[￿af ˛ R (af+z)pu
R ( A- (￿ wRi (bi) ˛ R wRi g(wRi ) dwRi) ) h(af ) daf ]
+[ ￿af ˛ F (a+z) pu
F (gA-wF ) h(af ) daf ].
(6')
III.3.2. Division of Firms between the two Search Channels
Given that a job is filled through referrals, it is optimal for the firm to pay an
efficiency wage that minimizes its labor cost per efficiency unit.  Given that a job is
filled formally, the firm pays the market wage because it is too costly to motivate
workers.  Thus, hiring through referrals allows firms to save on monitoring costs or,
equivalently, to increase output at a given wage.  The use of referrals, however,
requires higher search costs than formal channels, because they require a longer
period to fill a vacancy and, thus, higher foregone profits.  Since the rate at which
vacant jobs are filled through referrals, (af+z)pu
R , differs across firms, some firms face
lower search costs when using referrals than others.  The split of firms between the
two search channels is determined by comparing the lifetime stream of profits of a
vacancy when the firm hires through referrals and pays efficiency wages, VO
Ri*, to the
lifetime stream of profits of a vacancy when the firm hires formally and pays the
market wage, VO
F.  Firms with high arrival rates find it less costly to use referrals,
while firms with low arrival rates face high search costs from filling the vacancy
through referrals.  Proposition 1 determines the division of firms between the two29
search channels by establishing the cutoff arrival rate for the firm that is just
indifferent between the two hiring channels.
PROPOSITION 1:  For firms with idiosyncratic arrival rates of applicants af˛[acrit,a]
it is optimal to hire by employee referrals and pay efficiency wages.  For firms with
arrival rates af˛[a,acrit ] it is optimal to hire formally and pay the market wage, where
acrit is the cutoff arrival rate for the firm that is just indifferent between the two hiring





III.3.3. Division of Workers between the Two Search Channels
Workers are known to concentrate their time and effort on a few methods
when searching for work.
12  In the model, workers will either concentrate in searching
through formal channels or they focus their energy in reaching out to people in their
social network to help them find work.  As described in Wial’s study in Boston,
workers learn early on from their friends and relatives that the only way of obtaining a
“good” job is through luck or personal contacts.  Thus, from the workers perspective,
the only conceivable way of acting, if one wants to obtain a job that pays a high wage,
is by searching through referrals.  That is, workers observe the wages paid by firms
hiring through each channel and they focus their search accordingly.
While searching through one’s network of friends provides better jobs, the
lower arrival of job opportunities for some workers makes it very costly to insist on
using this search method without prolonging their unemployment durations
                                                       
12See, for example, the evidence presented by Holzer (1988).30
excessively.  Proposition 2 shows that the division of workers concentrating on
referral search and workers focusing on formal search is determined by the arrival rate
of encounters with those in one’s network for the worker who is ‘marginal’ between
the two methods.
PROPOSITION 2:  For workers with idiosyncratic arrival rates of encounters with
network members  bi˛[bcrit ,b],  it is optimal to search through referrals.  For workers
with arrival rates of encounters with network members  bi˛[b,bcrit ], it is optimal to
search formally, where bcrit is the arrival of encounters for the worker who is just
indifferent between searching through his social network and searching through





COROLLARY 2.1:  Since the cut-off arrival rate of job opportunities is
 bcrit = [bpu
F (wF+s) q] /[pu
R (r+x+bpu
F ) ê²(1-q)] ,
(viii)
then,
lim       bcrit =  b.
qﬁ1
When the peer-pressure imposed by referees, qê², is as costly as the disutility
from work, ê², workers obtain minimal or no rents at all and, thus, do not derive any
benefit from searching through referrals.  Moreover, since searching through referrals
provides less information on job opportunities, workers prefer to search formally.
Hence, when worker rents are dissipated because of the effectiveness of peer-
pressure, workers rely solely on formal search channels.31
An Extension: Heterogeneity in Worker Ability.  The assumption of
heterogeneous arrival rates of encounters with those in one’s social network may
underlie heterogeneous abilities among individuals.  That is, one may believe that
workers have different arrival rates of encounters with network members because of
differences in productivity.  In such a case, we can assume that the productivity of
each worker i is Ai, and that Ai is uniformly distributed from A to A.  Then, the arrival
rate of encounters for individual i can be assumed to be a function of his productivity,
b(Ai)=BAi.  Substituting  b(Ai)=BAi into the proof for proposition 2 yields the cutoff
productivity, Acrit , for the worker who is just indifferent between searching through
either method. Proposition 2' would then replace Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2':  For workers with productivity Ai˛[Acrit ,A], it is optimal to
search through referrals.  For workers with productivity Ai˛[A,Acrit], it is optimal to
search formally, where Acrit is the productivity of the worker who is just indifferent
between searching through his social network and searching through formal channels.





and equal to Acrit =  [Apu




III.4. Equilibrium Matching and the Segmentation of the Labor Market
                                                       
13This modification of the model would also require to adjust the division of firms between the two
search channels.  The rational expectations equilibrium would require that the expected productivity
of firms using referrals would be equal to the mean productivity of workers searching through
referrals.  Likewise, the expected productivity of firms using formal channels would have to be equal
to the mean productivity of workers searching formally.32
In steady-state equilibrium, the flow into unemployment for workers who
were hired through referrals is equal to the flow out of unemployment for workers
searching through referral networks.  This steady-state condition is given by equation
(9) in the model:
[￿bi ˛ R  b i pu
R uRi LR f(b i) db i ] = x [￿af ˛ R  (1 - oRf ) KR h(af ) daf ].
14
(9)
Since we know that individuals with  bi˛[bcrit,b] use referrals and firms with




 bcrit  b i pu
R uRi (1-F(bcrit )) f(bi )dbi ]
= x [ ￿
a
acrit (1 - oRf ) (1-H(acrit )) h(af ) daf ].
(9')





acrit (1 - oRf ) (1-H(acrit )) h(af ) daf ] /
[ ￿
 b
 bcrit  bi uRi (1-F(bcrit )) f(bi ) dbi ].
Thus, the effectiveness of referral search for workers increases as more firms fill their
vacancies through referrals, and it decreases as more unemployed workers search
through referrals.  The close form solution for pu
R is determined by substituting
equations (1) and (3) from the model into the pu
R equation.  Equation (1) determines
that the probability that a worker searching through referrals moves from employment
into unemployment is equal to the probability that he moves from unemployment into
employment.  Similarly, equation (3) determines that the probability that a firm hiring33
through referrals fills a vacant job is equal to the probability that its filled job becomes
vacant.
Likewise, to determine the effectiveness of formal search, we use the steady-
state condition that the flow into unemployment of those who were hired formally is
equal to the aggregate flow out of unemployment for those searching formally.  This
steady-state condition is given by equation (10) in the model:
[￿bi ˛ F b pu
F uF LF f(bi ) dbi ] = x [￿af ˛ F (1 - oF ) KF h(af ) daf ].
(10)
Since we know that individuals with  bi˛[b,bcrit] use formal channels and firms with
af˛[a,acrit] hire formally, we can substitute for these in the steady-state condition and
then solve for the effectiveness of referral search, pu
F,
pu
F = x [ ￿a
acrit (1 - oF ) H(acrit ) h(af ) daf] /
 [ ￿ b
 bcrit   b uF F(bcrit ) f(bi ) dbi ].
Thus, the effectiveness of formal search for workers increases with a greater number
of firms filling their vacancies formally, and with a smaller number of unemployed
workers searching formally.  The close form solution for pu
F is determined by
substituting equations (2) and (4) from the model into the equation above.  Equation
(2) determines that the probability that a worker searching formally moves from
employment into unemployment is equal to the probability that he moves from
unemployment into employment.  Similarly, equation (4) determines that the
probability that a firm hiring formally fills a vacant job is equal to the probability that
its filled job becomes vacant.
                                                                                                                                                            
14LM is the proportion of workers using method M, and KM is the proportion of firms hiring through
method M.34
To determine the rate at which firms using each method fill their jobs, we
consider the steady-state conditions that the flow of vacant jobs equals the aggregate
flow of unemployed workers going into jobs through  each channel.  Equation (11)
determines that for firms using referrals, it must be that the flow of vacant jobs being
filled through referrals is equal to the flow of unemployed workers hired through
referrals,
[￿af ˛ R (af + z) po
R oRf KR h(af ) daf ] = [￿bi ˛ R bi pu
R uRi LR f(bi ) dbi ].
(11)
Substituting for the types using referrals into this steady-state condition yields the
effectiveness of search for firms hiring though referrals, po
R,
po
R = [ ￿
 b
 bcrit  bi pu
R uRi (1-F(bcrit )) f(bi )  dbi ] /
[ ￿
a
acrit (af + z) oRf (1-H(acrit )) h(af ) daf ].
Thus, the rate at which firms hiring through referrals fill jobs increases with the
number of workers searching through referrals and it decreases with the number of
firms hiring through this channel.
Similarly, equation (12) determines that for firms hiring formally, it must be
that the flow of vacant jobs filled formally is equal to the flow of unemployed workers
hired formally,
[￿af ˛ F (a + z) po
F oF KF h(af ) daf ] =[￿bi ˛ F b pu
F uF LF f(bi ) dbi ].
(12)
Substituting for the types using formal channels into the steady-state condition yields
the effectiveness of search for firms hiring formally, po
F,
po
F = [ ￿ b
 bcrit b pu
F uF F(bcrit ) f(bi ) dbi ]/
 [ ￿a
acrit (a + z) oF H(acrit ) h(af ) daf ].35
Thus, the rate at which firms hiring formally fill jobs increases with the number of
workers searching formally and decreases with the number of firms hiring through
formal channels.
The steady-state conditions presented above show that the matching process
generates labor market segmentation.  Search decisions sort heterogeneous firms and
workers into two groups: referrals match ‘good’ jobs to ‘good’ workers, while formal
methods match less attractive jobs to disadvantaged workers.
  The costs of referral search are lower for firms that offer more attractive
conditions and receive more applicants, high af firms, and for well-connected workers
who learn more quickly about job opportunities,  high bi workers.  Thus, these firms
and workers self-select into referral matches.  Moreover, firms hiring through referrals
pay efficiency wages and, hence, referred workers earn higher wages.  Jobs filled
through referrals, thus, attract queues of workers waiting for ‘good’ jobs and  well-
connected workers can use referrals to jump the queues for these good jobs.
Formal methods match less attractive firms, low af firms, to those workers
facing less opportunities in the labor market, low bi workers.  Since the costs of
referral search are higher for firms with low arrival rates of applicants and for workers
with low arrival rates of job opportunities, these firms and workers self-select into
formal matches.  Moreover, firms hiring formally pay market clearing wages and,
thus, workers hired through formal methods earn lower wages.
IV.  Unemployment with Congestion Externalities in Referral Search
  In deciding where to focus their search, workers consider their private gain
from using employee referrals but they ignore the externality imposed on other36
workers searching through this channel.  A worker deciding to search through friends
and relatives considers his probability of obtaining a job if focusing search in this way,
but he does not take into account the effect of his decision on others.  In fact, the
worker lowers the probability of getting jobs for all other workers searching through
referrals.  By entering a queue for scarce “good” jobs, he lowers everyone else’s
arrival rate of job offers.  Moreover, the negative externalities that result from
congestion become worse as firms pay higher above market clearing wages and
increase job rationing.
This congestion in the search process implies that the split in the population
between formal search and search through referrals is not optimal.  Moreover,
because search activities determine the duration of unemployment, the unemployment
rate is unlikely to be optimal. The lower arrival rate of job offers that results from
congestion, increases the duration of unemployment for each worker searching
through referrals.  These congestion externalities cause the unemployment rate to be
too high because unemployment spells are prolonged as a result of crowding.  Below
we will show that a combination of taxes and subsidies can increase formal search
and, thus, reduce unemployment closer to its optimal rate.
IV.1. The Effects of Congestion on Unemployment Duration
The duration of unemployment for an individual depends inversely on his
probability of obtaining a job.  In particular, the duration of unemployment for an
unemployed worker searching through formal methods is
DFi = (1/ bpu
F ).
(ix)37
Similarly, the unemployment duration for a worker i searching through referrals is
DRi = (1/ bi pu
R ).
(x)
Comparing (ix) and (x) shows that a given individual i experiences longer
unemployment duration when searching through referrals compared to when
searching formally.  The longer spells of unemployment when searching through
referrals result for two reasons: (1) referrals are a more time-consuming channel of
finding jobs, and (2) congestion in referral search occurs because too many workers
search for a good job and these ‘good’ jobs are scarce.  This congestion prolongs the
time a worker must wait for a good job.  The effect of crowding on the duration of
unemployment can be seen by substituting for the arrival rate of job offers through
referrals, pu
R, into equation (x):
DRi =   [ ￿
 b
 bcrit  bi uRi (￿
 b
 bcrit f(bi )dbi ) f(bi ) dbi ] /
 bi x [ ￿
a
acrit (1 - oRf ) ( ￿
a
acrit h(af ) daf ) h(af ) daf ].
(x’)
Unemployment duration for workers searching through referrals is longer
when the number of workers using referrals is large, bcrit is small.  The increased
congestion decreases the arrival of job opportunities through referrals and, thus,
lowers the likelihood of finding a good job.  Thus, workers searching through
referrals experience longer unemployment spells due to the negative externality in
referral search.   Moreover, when the number of jobs filled through referrals is smaller
(jobs filled through referrals are scarcer), acrit is large, workers searching through
referrals experience longer spells of unemployment because they have to wait longer
in the queue to obtain a good job.38
The average duration of unemployment in the economy is the average duration
of unemployment for workers searching through referrals plus the average duration of
unemployment for workers searching formally, which can be obtained by using
equations (ix) and (x),
D=  DR + DF
where,




 bcrit bi uRi (1-F(bcrit )) f(bi ) dbi ] /
 bi x[ ￿
a
acrit (1 - oRf ) (1-H(acrit )) h(af ) daf] f(bi ) dbi } / (1-F(bcrit ))
and,




 b b uF F(bcrit ) f(bi ) dbi ] /
  bx[ ￿a
acrit (1 - oF  ) H(acrit ) h(af ) daf ] f(bi ) dbi } / F(bcrit ).
In equilibrium, workers searching formally experience shorter unemployment spells
than workers using referrals because the rate at which unemployed workers searching
formally find jobs is higher.  By contrast, while well-connected workers self-select
into referral search, congestion in referral search prolongs the time they must wait for
good jobs.  This finding accords with the evidence provided by Clark and Summers
(1979) and Summers (1986) which indicates that “persons losing high wage jobs are
most likely to experience protracted spells of unemployment.” (p.382)
IV.2. Market and Non-market Mechanisms to Reduce Unemployment
At the margin, inducing workers to search formally decreases congestion in
referral matching and reduces the average duration of unemployment in the economy.39
Thus,  increasing the incentives for workers to search through formal channels
mitigates the externalities and increases the efficiency of the labor market.
A Market Mechanism.  One way of overcoming congestion externalities is to set up
a missing market for referrals.  The payment of referral bonuses to current employees
does precisely this.  In their pioneering study of referrals, Rees and Shultz (1970)
indicated that several of the establishments they interviewed “paid bonuses to
[current] employees for referrals who were hired; in one case the bonus was fifty
dollars per hire.”  The payment of bonuses increases the peer-pressure imposed on
referred workers who shirk, because current workers would be forced to forfeit the
bonuses paid by their employers.  In turn, greater peer-pressure by referees decreases
the efficiency wage that employers have to pay.  Thus, the bonus is a transfer from the
referred worker to his friend.  The effect of this bonus is to reduce the benefit from
using referrals and to increase, at the margin, the number of workers who search
formally (see Corollary 2.1).  The payment of referral bonuses could then decrease the
average duration of unemployment by mitigating congestion externalities.  Given the
benefit of paying referral bonuses, why then are these bonuses not used more widely?
Although a worker prefers for other workers to pay a transfer to their referees
because this reduces congestion, he personally prefers to earn higher rents rather than
transfer the bonus to his referee.  Thus, while firms that pay referral bonuses increase
the referees incentives to recruit his friends and relatives, these referees face greater
difficulty attracting job applicants.
Taxes and Subsidies.  A second way of reducing congestion is by introducing the
proper combination of taxes and subsidies that correct the inefficiencies in the market.40
Imposing a tax on the unemployed not only reduces shirking incentives, as proposed
by Shapiro and Stiglitz, but the tax also increases the incentives to search formally.
Similarly, a subsidy paid to unemployed workers who start a new job increases the
incentive to search through formal channels which are less time-consuming.  Because
referrals prolong the spell of unemployment relative to formal methods for a given
individual, an increase in the costs of search provides incentives for workers to use
formal search channels.  Moreover, the increase in formal search that would ensue
from taxing the unemployed or from paying them a job-start subsidy, reduces the
extent of congestion in referral matching and shortens unemployment duration for
workers using referrals.  Consequently, a tax on the unemployed or a subsidy paid to
unemployed workers who start a job would help reduce unemployment closer to its
optimal rate.
In addition, providing wage subsidies or vouchers to firms that hire the
unemployed can also help mitigate crowding in referral search.  As it has been
indicated, the problem of congestion arises because jobs filled through referrals are
rationed.  Providing a wage subsidy increases short-run profits, promoting entry and
increasing the number of jobs in the economy.  Moreover, increasing the overall
number of jobs increases the probability of obtaining a job through referrals and
reduces the duration of unemployment for workers searching through this method.
When the number of people using referrals is very large, imposing taxes on the
unemployed, paying subsidies for job-start, or providing wage vouchers to firms that
hire the unemployed would decrease the unemployment rate and increase welfare.
We conduct welfare analysis to show this formally.  Total welfare in the economy is41
equal to the sum of utility and profits for all employees and firms matching through
referrals and formal channels.  Thus, the welfare function is,
W = A(ER +  EF ) - rK -  ê²ER - s(UR + UF ).
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To see how an unemployment tax (or, equivalently, an employment subsidy for the
unemployed) and a wage subsidy would affect social welfare, we consider the effect
of a change in both search costs and the total number of jobs.  Proposition 3 provides
the conditions under which the taxes-cum-subsidies proposed above would increase
welfare.
PROPOSITION 3:  When the number of workers using referrals is very large, bcrit is
small (e.g, q is small), then ¶²W/¶K¶s > 0.  When the number of workers searching
through referrals is small, bcrit is large (e.g., q is large), then ¶²W/¶K¶s < 0.
This proposition indicates that when the number of workers searching through
referrals is large and, presumably, congestion externalities are severe, an increase in
search costs increases the welfare improvement from creating more jobs.  If on the
contrary, most workers search formally, imposing a tax on the unemployed would
decrease welfare when new jobs are being created.
V.  Discussion of the Model and the Evidence
Previous economic theories of referrals cannot explain the link between
referrals and the inter-industry wage structure.  In contrast, the bonding theory of
referrals presented in this paper is consistent with the empirical regularities
documented in Section II.
                                                       
15The total number of filled and vacant jobs in this economy is determined endogenously and given
by equation (13) in the model, K = JR + JF + OR + OF.42
V.1. Match-Quality and Ability-Based Theories of Referrals
Match-quality theories developed to explain the widespread use of referral
search in the labor market cannot explain the relation between referrals and inter-
industry wage differentials.  According to these theories, referrals provide prospective
applicants with superior match-quality information which allows them to self-select
into jobs in which they are more productive. (Staiger, 1990; Simon and Warner,
1992) While these theories are able to explain why workers hired through referrals
earn higher wages, they cannot explain why industries that pay wage premiums to all
workers rely more extensively on employee referrals.  Neither can match-quality
theories explain why product market characteristics (e.g., profits, concentration
ratios) should be associated with greater reliance on employee referrals.  Moreover,
match-quality explanations of referrals would predict lower turnover and lower
unemployment in sectors hiring through referrals, because, according to these
theories, referrals help to smooth frictions associated with search in the labor market.
The evidence in Section II shows that individual workers hired through referrals have
longer tenures, but that unemployment is higher in sectors where employee referrals
are used more extensively.
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Ability-based theories of referrals explain why firms may want to use referrals
when the labor market is characterized by adverse selection.  One version of this
theory suggests that employers solicit referrals from high-ability employees when they
cannot observe the quality of applicants. (Montgomery, 1991) Another version argues
that  referees tend to refer high quality applicants because they may feel that their own43
reputation is at stake when making a referral. (Saloner, 1985).  Like match-quality
theories, ability-based theories of referrals can explain why referred workers earn
higher wages.  Moreover, a modified version of this model which allows for two
sectors with different technologies, an ability-sensitive technology and a less-ability
sensitive technology, can explain the association between industry wage differentials
and referral hiring that we observe in the data.  Moreover, this version of the theory
may explain why product market characteristics related to technology are associated
with greater reliance on employee referrals.  Ability based-theories, however, have
difficulty explaining the higher unemployment and lower turnover of workers in
sectors that rely extensively on referrals.  Finally, contrary to the empirical findings,
these theories predict that workers with higher measured ability (in terms of
education, occupation, etc.) would be hired through referrals.
V.2. The Bonding Theory of Referrals and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure
The bonding theory of referrals presented in this paper is able to explain the
relation between referrals and the inter-industry wage structure.  This theory argues
that,  when firms hire through referrals, they are able to replicate an honest work
force without the need to share a significant fraction of their rents.  Rent-sharing firms
can, thus, save on labor costs by relying on employee referrals.  Consequently, jobs
filled through referrals tend to be scarce and, thus, employees looking for work in this
way tend to face congestion in their search.
This bonding theory can explain why sectors that pay wage premiums rely
more extensively on employee referrals.  The theory can also explain why product
                                                                                                                                                            
16Match-quality theories do not predict anything with respect to the types of workers one should44
market characteristics associated with the payment of rents are related to the use of
referrals in an industry.  Moreover, according to the theory, industries that rely on
referrals pay rents and ration their jobs, and thus the higher unemployment observed
in these industries.  In addition, the theory predicts that the excessive search for
scarce jobs can generate congestion which further increases unemployment by
lengthening the average spell of unemployment.  The scarcity of jobs filled through
referrals can also explain why referred workers have longer tenures.  If referred
workers indeed earned rents, we would expect them to have lower turnover and
longer tenures.
It remains to explain the link between referrals and the occupational structure.
The evidence in Section II indicates that referrals are used more widely to hire blue-
collar and service workers compared to white-collar employees.  A careful
examination of the model suggests an explanation why firms would tend to hire
specialized workers through formal methods, while hiring less-specialized workers
through referrals.  When employers face a higher arrival rate of applicants, for
example because of the relative abundance of the applicant group been sought (e.g.,
unskilled workers), they face a lower opportunity cost of holding a vacancy and, thus,
they are more likely to use time-consuming channels such as referrals to fill their
vacancies.  On the contrary, when employers search for very specialized skills (e.g., a
bassoon player, or a deep sea diver), they expect to receive a limited pool of
applicants and, thus, they focus their search through formal channels.
17
                                                                                                                                                            
expect to match through referrals.
17In the model, higher values of z, higher arrival rates for all firms, are associated with lower values
of the cutoff arrival rate, acrit.45
VI.  Conclusion
Previous research has documented that workers who find their jobs through
referrals earn higher wages and have longer tenures than workers hired formally.  This
paper provides new evidence on the link between referrals and the inter-industry wage
structure.
The paper develops a matching model with referrals and formal search
methods which can explain why rent sharing firms rely more on referrals.  First, I find
that the gains from paying wages above market clearing are the greatest for firms
hiring through referrals because of the peer monitoring role played by referees.  A
firm hiring through referrals can pay lower wages to motivate workers because the
referees provide an implicit bond for new employees.  Thus, when the benefit from
paying efficiency wages is greater, firms use referrals more widely.  Second, whether
firms rely on employee referrals depends on the cost of filling vacancies through this
method.   The opportunity cost of using referrals is the prolonged time the vacancy
remains unfilled due to the smaller applicant pool obtained through referrals.  Thus,
firms that are more attractive and have higher arrival rates of applicants rely more on
employee referrals.  Similarly,  workers’ decisions on where to focus their search
activities depends on the opportunity cost of relying on friends and relatives to obtain
jobs.  While referrals are a way of obtaining ‘good’ jobs, when workers search
through referrals they learn about fewer job opportunities.  Thus, well-connected46
workers who receive more job offers self-select into referral matches, but
disadvantaged workers tend to focus their search formally.
The matching process generates labor market segmentation.  Moreover, the
payment of wages above market clearing implies that jobs filled by employee referrals
are rationed and workers must queue to obtain these high-wage jobs.  Since network
size varies, well- connected workers (those belonging to large networks) can use
referrals as an exercise in queue jumping.  By contrast, workers belonging to
restrictive networks may never even attempt queuing for these good jobs.  Moreover,
since networks are a by-product of social interactions, some demographic groups
(e.g., men compared to women) may have more access than others to jobs in high-
wage industries.
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The implications of the model are borne out by the empirical evidence.  First, I
find that industries with a higher proportion of referred workers pay wage premiums.
Also, industries with industry characteristics identified with high-wage industries rely
more extensively on referrals.  I also find that, even after controlling for worker
quality and other industry characteristics, industries with higher percentages of
referred workers provide higher total compensation (including wage compensation
and fringe benefits).  Finally, as predicted by the model, unemployment rates are
higher in industries that have a larger percentage of referred workers.
The analysis indicates that the equilibrium unemployment rate in the economy
is unlikely to be efficient.  The split of workers between referrals an formal search is
not optimal because there are congestion externalities in referral search.  When
                                                       
18The results in Tables 1-4 show that, in fact, industries where a larger fraction of workers is hired
through referrals also have a larger fraction of male workers.47
deciding to search through referrals workers generate congestion because, by entering
a queue for good jobs, they lower everyone else’s probability of obtaining a job.
When jobs are rationed, this congestion prolongs the average unemployment duration
in the economy.  Workers searching through referrals stay “too long” waiting for
good jobs.  Moreover, while those who are first in the queue may do well in the long
term by using referrals, those who are last in the queue may experience long spells of
unemployment due to a poor start.  Early successful matches mediated through
referrals can lead workers to accumulate more contacts and, thus, to further improve
their matches over time.  However, poor early matches due to lack of information
may initiate a history of unemployment for those searching through restricted
networks which can become self-sustaining.  The presence of congestion externalities
and path-dependency suggests that improving the incentives for workers “at the
margin” to search formally would reduce the duration of unemployment.  This may be
why public employment service programs seem to reduce unemployment spells for
both program participants and for non-participants (Meyer, 1991).  Moreover, since
the isolation of the long-term unemployed from personalized networks worsens the
psychological effects of unemployment, increased incentives to use public
employment offices can help to mitigate the discouraged worker effect that long-term
unemployed workers tend to experience.
The division of firms between the two search channels is also unlikely to be
efficient because firms’ choices of hiring methods impose external effects on each
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other.
19  When a firm decides to use employee referrals, it increases the hiring rate for
workers searching through networks and makes it harder to motivate new employees.
The greater is the hiring rate through referrals, the higher the efficiency wage required
to motivate workers and the higher the level of involuntary unemployment.  At the
margin, it is optimal to induce firms to hire formally.   In the United States and
Europe, public policy discussions have suggested the need to improve the services
provided by public employment agencies in order to increase firms’ incentives to use
formal channels.  In Europe, it has been argued that allowing private agencies to
provide similar services may be beneficial.  The availability of private employment
agencies would induce more firms to hire formally and help to reduce unemployment.
The general equilibrium analysis in this paper contributes to an understanding of what
policies directed at workers and employers can improve the efficiency of the labor
market.
APPENDIX
                                                       
19The discussion here closely follows David Levine’s analysis (Levine, 1989) of firms’ external
effects when there is moral hazard.49
Division of Firms between the two Search Channels
Proof of Lemma 1.1:
To ensure that an employed worker hired through referrals exerts effort, the firm has
to pay a wage to satisfy the no-shirking condition (NSC):  VE
Ri  ￿ VS
Ri.  Thus, the
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Ri ) =  ê²(1 - q)/q.
Furthermore, using equation (8) from the model to solve for wR, rearranging, and then
substituting (v) and the above derivation of worker rents yields:
wRi =  ê² + x(VE
Ri - VU
Ri ) + rVE
Ri
wRi = ê² + (r+x)(VE
Ri - VU
Ri ) + rVU
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wRi = ê² + (r+x)(VE
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* = ê² - s + (r+x+ bi pu
R ) ê² (1 - q)/q.
The last line, gives the lowest wage the firm can pay to still satisfy the NSC, wRi
*.
The lowest wage a firm hiring formally can pay and still satisfy the no-shirking
condition must meet the condition: VE
Fi = VS
Fi.  Solving this problem as described
above yields the rents earned by workers hired through formal methods:  (VE
Fi - VU
Fi )
= ê²/q.  Thus, workers hired by firms that satisfy the NSC and hire through formal
methods earn higher rents than workers hired through referrals.  The lowest wage
satisfying the NSC when firms hire formally is:50
wF
* = ê² - s + (r+x+ bpu
F ) ê²/q.
Proof of Lemma 1.2:
Using wRi
* from Lemma 1.1 and taking the limit of the efficiency wage as qﬁ1 yields,
lim        ê² - s + (r+x+bi pu
R ) ê²(1 - q)/q =  ê² - s.
          qﬁ1
Proof of Proposition 1:
Given the wages that firms pay when they choose each hiring method, we can
determine how firms split in the use of the two hiring channels.  When a firm holds a
vacancy, it focuses on the hiring method that maximizes its lifetime stream of profits.
Firms whose lifetime stream of profits are greater when they use referrals and pay
efficiency wages, VO
Ri*, than when they use formal channels and pay the market wage,
VO
F, will prefer hiring through employee referrals and, vice-versa.  Thus, to determine
the division of firms between the two hiring channels, we compare the lifetime stream
of profits given the optimal wage/hiring channel combinations.  If VO
Ri* > VO
F, then
firms hire through referrals.  By contrast, if  VO
Ri* < VO
F, then firms hire through
formal channels.  Thus, the firm for which VO
Ri* = VO
F is the firm which is just
indifferent between hiring through referrals and hiring through formal methods.
Moreover, while the benefits from using referrals are uniform across firms, the cost of
using referrals increases as the firm’s idiosyncratic arrival rate gets smaller. We can,
thus, determine the cutoff (or critical value) arrival rate for the firm which is just
indifferent between the two methods by equating VO
Ri* to VO
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Solving for this equation we then obtain the critical value for the idiosyncratic arrival
rate of applicants, acrit,
acrit = -{ (a+z)(r+x+zpo
R)po
F [A(1-g) - ( (￿ wRi(bi ) ˛ R wRi
* g(wRi
* ) dwRi
* ) - wF  )] } /





F [ A(1-g) - ( (￿ wRi(bi ) ˛ R wRi
* g(wRi
* ) dwRi
* ) -wF  ) ] }
In equilibrium, firms with arrival rates af˛[acrit ,a] hire through referrals, while firms
with arrival rates af˛[a,acrit ] hire through formal channels.
Division of Workers between the two Search Channels
Proof for Proposition 2:
In order to determine who uses referrals and who uses formal methods, I find
the arrival rate of offers for an individual who is just indifferent between using either
search method, bcrit.  The value of bcrit is, thus, given by equating the expected lifetime
utility when the worker searches through referrals to the expected lifetime utility when
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Ri ) and  (VE
Fi - VU
Fi )  and rearranging, yields the cutoff
arrival rate of offers,
 bcrit = [bpu
F (wF+s) q] /[pu
R (r+x+bpu
F )ê²(1 - q)] ,52
Since (VU
Ri - VU
Fi ) is increasing in bi , unemployed workers with arrival rate of offers
bi˛[bcrit,b] search through referrals, and unemployed workers with arrival rate of
offers  bi˛[b,bcrit ] search through formal methods.
Proof of Corollary 2.1:
Taking the limit of bcrit from Proposition 2 as qﬁ1:
lim        [ bpu
F (wF+s) q] /[pu
R (r+x+bpu
F ) ê²(1-q)] ﬁ  ￿.
qﬁ1
Proof for Proposition 2':
We assume that workers are heterogeneous with respect to ability and that
worker productivity is uniformly distributed from A to A.  Moreover, we assume that
the arrival rate of offers of each worker i depends positively on his productivity.  In
particular, we assume that  b(Ai) = BAi.
In order to determine who uses referrals and who uses formal methods, I find
the productivity of the individual who is just indifferent between using either search
method, Acrit.  The value of Acrit is, thus, given by equating the expected lifetime utility
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Ri ) and  (VE
Fi - VU
Fi )  and rearranging, yields the cutoff
arrival rate of offers,
Acrit = [Apu
F (wF+s) q] /[pu
R (r+x+ABpu
F ) ê²(1-q)] ,53
Since (VU
Ri - VU
Fi ) is increasing in Ai , unemployed workers with arrival rate of offers
Ai˛[Acrit,A] search through referrals, and unemployed workers with arrival rate of
offers Ai˛[A,Acrit] search through formal methods.
Welfare Analysis
Proof for Proposition 3:
Total welfare in the economy is equal to the sum of utility and profits for all
employees and firms matching through referrals and formal channels.  Thus, the
welfare function is,
W = A(ER +  EF ) - rK -  ê²ER - s(UR + UF ),
where the total number of filled and vacant jobs in this economy is K = JR + JF + OR +
OF.  Moreover, the total number of employed and unemployed workers in the
economy is L = ER + EF + UR + UF. Thus, we can substitute UR + UF = L - ER - EF
into the welfare function,
W = A(ER + gEF ) - rK - ê²ER - s(L - ER - EF ).
To observe the welfare effects of an increase in the total number of jobs, we take the
derivative of the welfare function with respect to K,
 ¶W/¶K = (A -  ê² + s)¶ER /¶K + (gA+s)¶EF /¶K - r.
(xi)
To find  ¶ER/¶K and ¶EF/¶K we use the definitions of L and K (equations (13) and
(14) in the model) together with the steady-state conditions to obtain two equations in
terms of ER and EF.  Using the steady-state conditions which determine that the inflow
into unemployment has to equal the flow out of unemployment for each method, we
can obtain UR and UF in terms of  ER and EF, respectively, and the parameters of the
model:54
UR = 2xER /[ ￿
 b
 bcrit  bi pu
R f(bi ) dbi ]
and
UF = 2xEF /[ ￿ b
 bcrit  b pu
F f(bi ) dbi ].
Substituting these two expressions into L yields,
L= ER + 2xER / [ ￿
 b
 bcrit  bi pu
R f(bi ) dbi ] + EF + 2xEF / [ ￿ b
 bcrit  b pu
F f(bi ) dbi ].
(xv)
Similarly, we can use the steady state conditions which determine that flow of filled
vacancies has to equal the flow out of newly available jobs.  We can obtain OR and OF
in terms of  ER and EF, respectively, and the parameters of the model:
OR = 2xER / [ ￿
a
acrit  (af + z)po
R h(af ) daf ].
and
OF = 2xEF / [ ￿a
acrit  (a + z)po
F h(af ) daf ].




R h(af ) daf ]+EF+2xEF / [￿a
acrit  (a+z)po
F h(af ) daf ].
(xvi)
We then solve for ER using equation (xv) and substitute ER into (xvi).  This gives an
expression for EF in terms of exogenous variables which allows to take the derivative
of  EF with respect to K.  Likewise, we can solve for EF using equation (xv) and
substitute EF into (xvi).  This gives an expression for ER in terms of exogenous
variables which allows to take the derivative of  ER with respect to K.
To see how an unemployment tax or, equivalently, an employment subsidy for
the unemployed affects the welfare effect of a change in the number of jobs, we take
the derivative of (xiv) with respect to s, the search cost:
¶ ²W/¶K¶s =  ¶ER/¶K + ¶EF/¶K.
(xvii)55
The sign of (xvii) is given by:
Sign { ¶²W/¶K¶s} = Sign {[pu
R  b² + pu
F  b² - (pu
R + pu
F ) bcrit²]}
Thus, if bcrit is small (e.g., q is small), then  ¶²W/¶K¶s > 0.   If, on the contrary, the
number of workers searching formally is large,  bcrit is large (e.g., q is large), then
¶²W/¶K¶s < 0.
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